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Abstract
Foraging decisions in nonhuman animals often require choosing between small, immediate food rewards and
larger, more delayed rewards. Faced with such choices, animals typically discount or devalue the future quite
strongly. Although discounting studies often focus on delays to reward access, other temporal intervals contribute to foraging rate, and thus may potentially influence discounting levels. Here, we examine the effect of handling time, the time required to process and consume food, on discounting in cottontop tamarins, Saguinus oedipus, and common marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, two species that differ in levels of temporal discounting. We
presented subjects with a discounting task under two conditions. In the first condition, we made the entire reward available after the delay expired. In the second condition, we experimentally increased the minimum length
of time required to consume the reward to simulate a longer handling time. We found that tamarins and marmosets showed sensitivity to increases in the time necessary to process food rewards. Both species adjusted their
preferences to account for different handling times at long delays to accessing food. Consequently, models of discounting behaviour that include handling times may better describe animal choices than models that focus exclusively on delays prior to access.

In an ultimate, evolutionary sense, the significance of any
decision rule is measured in lifetime reproductive success. Although this implies that animals should attempt
to maximize the consequences of their actions over the
long term, overwhelming experimental evidence from
laboratory studies of temporal discounting indicate that
animals rarely make far-sighted decisions (Green et al.,
1981; Logue, 1988; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; Rachlin,
2000; Roberts, 2002; Kacelnik, 2003). Rather, they appear to discount or devalue the future and maximize intake in the short term, one decision at a time. Specifically, animals do not treat all temporal components of the
decision-making process as equally relevant. Stephens &
Anderson (2001) emphasized that in experimental situations, foragers often ignore the time between trials
(Mazur, 1989; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996), postfeeding
delays (Lea, 1979; Logue et al., 1985) and the latency
from when the choice period begins to when a decision
is made (Bateson & Kacelnik 1996). The delay-to-food access, or the time between making a choice and receiving
the reward, has the strongest influence over choice behaviour: animals subjectively devalue rewards even when

the delay is no more than a few seconds (Ainslie, 1974;
Mazur, 1987; Kacelnik, 1997). Taken together, these findings suggest that animals pay more attention to the time
between a decision and its consequences than to intervals that occur outside of this range.
Another key temporal component that falls inside this
critical range is handling time, or the period necessary
for a forager to actually process and consume food (Stephens & Krebs 1986). Studies of optimal foraging theory have demonstrated the importance of handling time
in prey selection (Lea, 1979; Snyderman, 1983; Shettleworth, 1985). For example, in various species, the ease of
cracking open nuts (i.e. handling time) influences an individual’s decision to either consume or cache those nuts
(Woodrey, 1990; Jacobs, 1992; Cristol, 2001).
Handling time is integral to studies of temporal discounting because it occurs after the food is initially accessed, but before another decision can be executed.
Many studies of discounting, however, ignore handling
time. In fact, most psychologists studying animal discounting confound reward amount and handling time by
using time of access to the food as the reinforcer (Rachlin
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and Green, 1972; Ainslie, 1974; Mazur, 1987, 2000; Tobin
and Logue, 1994). There are, however, two notable exceptions. Bateson & Kacelnik (1996) used food pellet number as the reward amount and measured European starlings’, Sturnus vulgaris, handling time in a foraging task.
They found that a rate maximization model that included
both delay to access and handling time best described the
subjects’ decisions. Further evidence that handling time
may be important in discounting comes from research
examining animal preferences between sequences of rewards ( Brunner & Gibbon 1995). Brunner & Gibbon allowed rats, Rattus norvegicus, to choose between two delayed sequences of rewards in which individual pieces of
food become available successively. By varying the time
between rewards, they could assess the role of the temporal spacing of food accrual in the overall discounting
decision. Subjects preferred a more delayed clumped option to a less delayed spaced-out reward sequence that
took longer to eat, implying that they may have avoided
options with longer handling times.
Here, we examine how lengthening handling time affects discounting preferences in two New World monkeys: cottontop tamarins, Saguinus oedipus, and common
marmosets, Callithrix jacchus. Specifically, we presented
subjects with a choice between smaller, immediate food
rewards and larger, delayed rewards under two conditions. In the first condition, the chosen food reward dispensed immediately after the delay expired. In the second
condition, we increased the minimum amount of time
necessary to consume both reward options by adding an
interpellet interval (IPI) between each successive piece of
food (Fig. 1). If handling time is a component of the discounting calculation in these animals, then they should
have a stronger preference for immediate rewards under the second condition, because the total amount of
time necessary to acquire and process rewards is longer.
Previous experiments with these species have characterized both their temporal discounting (Stevens et al.

Figure 1. Experimental conditions. Following a 30-s intertrial interval (ITI), subjects chose between receiving two food pellets immediately (t2 = 0.5 s) or six food pellets after a delay (t6 = 5, 10, or
15 s). (a) In the normal condition, the entire food reward was available following the chosen delay, so the subjects could consume or
“handle” the pellets at their leisure (h2 and h6). (b) In the incremental condition, an additional interpellet interval (IPI) spaced out
the distribution of the pellets and experimentally lengthened handling times h2’ and h6’.

2005a) and spatial discounting (Stevens et al. 2005b) levels. In the temporal discounting task, marmosets waited
a significantly longer time for the larger reward than did
tamarins, whereas in the distance discounting task, tamarins travelled much further for the large reward than did
the marmosets. These results are consistent with differences in their species-typical ecology. Both species feed
on fruit, insects and tree exudates such as sap and gum
(Snowdon and Soini, 1988; Stevenson and Rylands, 1988;
Garber, 1993; Rylands and de Faria, 1993). Cottontop
tamarins, however, spend 0–5% of their foraging time
feeding on exudates, whereas common marmosets spend
20–70% (Stevenson and Rylands, 1988; Power, 1996).
Therefore, marmosets rely much more heavily on exudates (Coimbra-Filho and Mittermeier, 1976; Stevenson
and Rylands, 1988; Rylands and de Faria, 1993; Harrison
and Tardif, 1994), a relatively stable food source that requires considerable investment: individuals must chew at
the surface of the tree and wait for sap to exude, so marmosets often spend 3–75 s actively gouging holes in the
trees before they begin feeding (Lacher et al., 1981; Stevenson and Rylands, 1988). Owing to this dietary niche,
exudate-feeding species of marmosets have a number of
specializations in dental, muscle and gut morphology and
physiology that tamarin species lack (Coimbra-Filho and
Mittermeier, 1976; Sussman and Kinzey, 1984; Ferrari
et al., 1993, Harrison and Tardif, 1994; Power and Oftedal, 1996; Dumont, 1997, Vinyard et al., 2003; and Taylor and Vinyard, 2004). Some suggest that selection for
exudate feeding is strong enough to influence marmoset
social systems, home range size and even spatial memory
(Ferrari and Lopes Ferrari, 1989; Ferrari, 1993; Harrison
and Tardif, 1994; Platt et al., 1996). In contrast, tamarins
feed more on insects and fruit. When they do feed on exudates, they primarily consume gums and saps that have
been previously exposed, thereby obtaining an immediate
reward in the absence of significant investment in extraction (Neyman, 1977; Garber, 1980, 1992, 1993; Sussman
and Kinzey, 1984). The marmosets’ specialization on exudate feeding may have also shaped their temporal discounting functions (Stevens et al. 2005a).
What is not yet clear, however, is whether tamarins
and marmosets demonstrate sensitivity to changes in handling time, or if they can adjust their choice behaviour
to accommodate such changes. The temporal discounting
experiment (Stevens et al. 2005a) showed that tamarins,
but not marmosets, rate-maximized over a time interval
that included the delay-to-food (tamarins: 5.6–9.8 s, marmosets: 10.0–19.0 s) and handling time (tamarins: 4.8–
46 s, marmosets: 6.2–21.8 s). Notably, this research suggests that tamarins and marmosets may actually make
decisions over different temporal horizons, with marmosets rate maximizing over a longer interval. We contend
that differences in optimal time horizons may be especially relevant when considering handling time, because
handling time varies in its contribution to total foraging
time across species. That is, although handling time may
be a significant temporal component of foraging for some
animals, for others, handling time may be negligible. For
instance, the size and type of food item greatly influence
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handling time. Large items or items with coverings and
inedible parts require longer handling times than small
items that lack protective coatings. Consequently, differences in handling time may be less salient to some species than others, simply because it makes a trivial contribution to foraging rate under some conditions. Moreover,
handling or processing different food resources may impose different opportunity costs. Some food types are durable and transportable, whereas others must be utilized
on the spot. We hypothesize that these considerations
may be especially relevant when considering tamarins
and marmosets because of their specialized feeding ecologies: insects, fruits and exudates differ in the temporal
properties associated with processing. Since the insects
upon which tamarins and marmoset feed are primarily
mobile insects such as grasshoppers, crickets, cicadas and
cockroaches (Stevenson & Rylands 1988), they can escape
quickly once predators are detected. In addition, both
fruits and insects can be consumed soon after capture.
Foraging for exudates as marmosets do, however, requires
gouging holes and waiting for gum or sap to seep out over
a longer time span. Therefore, when monkeys make a foraging choice by gouging holes in trees, they cannot reap
the rewards until after some delay. Because marmosets
are specialized exudate feeders, they may tolerate longer
handling times than tamarins. In contrast, tamarins might
be more sensitive to variation in search time, given their
primary consumption of fruits and insects.
Methods
Subjects
Four adult cottontop tamarins (two females and two males)
and four adult common marmosets (three males and one female) participated in this experiment. All four marmosets
had prior experience in a temporal discounting experiment
(Stevens et al. 2005a), and the tamarins were naïve to the
discounting task but had experience with a wide diversity of
experiments on tool use, cooperation, call perception, language processing and number representation (Hauser et al.,
2001, Hauser et al., 2003, Uller et al., 2001, Miller et al.,
2002 and Santos et al., 2003). In addition to food received in
experiments, we fed subjects a nightly meal and maintained
both species at approximately 90% free-feeding weight. This
weight range is similar to that observed for both species in
the wild (Snowdon and Soini, 1988 and Stevenson and Rylands, 1988). Before beginning the experiment, the marmosets weighed 310–365 g, and the tamarins weighed 400–465 g
(Table 1).
Experimental Design
We presented subjects with a choice between two immediate and six delayed banana-flavoured food pellets (Research Associates, 45 mg of purified primate diet pellets).
We used these food pellets to both gain direct control over
the quantity and size of food delivered and to directly contrast with prior experiments using the same food rewards.
Each subject experienced two food distribution conditions
(normal and incremental) at three delays to the large reward (5 s, 10 s and 15 s). We pseudorandomized the order of
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Table 1. Incremental condition interpellet interval (IPI) for each
subject, based on average handling time for six pellets.
Subject
ANT
OTH
JUL
ROM
RB
SH
JM
PJ

Species
M
M
M
M
T
T
T
T

Weight (g) Handling time (s)
310
315
365
330
440
465
450
400

9.99
15.3
11.1
15.3
14.4
14.1
11.4
23.7

IPI (s)
3.3
5.1
3.7
5.1
4.8
4.7
3.8
7.9

presentation such that each subject started with a different
condition/delay combination. In the normal distribution, all
the food dispensed approximately at once following the chosen delay (constraints on the dispensing machine resulted in
a short 0.4-s IPI between each successive piece of food being dispensed). In the incremental condition, an additional
IPI was added between each individual piece of food being
dispensed (Fig. 1). We calculated this IPI for each subject to
manipulate an individual’s overall handling time (Table 1).
For each condition–delay combination, subjects completed
three consecutive session replicates.
To determine the IPI for each subject, we first measured
each individual’s average handling time for consuming the
larger reward of six pellets (h6) over three training sessions
in which all the food dispensed at once (as in the normal
condition). Handling time consisted of the period from when
food was first available to when the subject placed the last
piece in his/her mouth. We divided this measurement by
the total number of pellets (six) to determine the per-pellet
handling time, and finally doubled it to lengthen each subject’s individual IPI. That is,

()

Incremental IPI = 2

h6
6

Apparatus and Set-up
We placed subjects in a small transport cage (30 × 30 ×
30 cm) inside a Plexiglas test enclosure (46 cm tall, 35.5 cm
wide and 40 cm deep; Fig. 2a). The back and side walls of
the test apparatus were opaque black; the front was white
and had three openings into which subjects could reach (Fig.
2b). Transparent Plexiglas doors prevented access to the two
side openings. When subjects were allowed to make a choice,
solenoids raised the doors, giving access to the openings,
which contained small plastic bars mounted by a spring to a
back wall. Subjects touched these tools to make their choice:
by reaching through either of the openings to touch the tool
inside, subjects broke an infrared beam (MED Associates
ENV-253SD) positioned slightly above the tool. Breaking either beam signalled a choice and started the corresponding
delay. Food dropped into a bin in the centre opening via a
small tube attached to a pellet dispenser (MED Associates
ENV-203IR). A small camera (Videolabs FlexCam) mounted
directly outside the food bin allowed the experimenter to
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Figure 2. Experimental apparatus. The transport cages containing the subjects were placed in the operant chamber. (a) Top view of chamber: subjects made a choice by reaching into one of the two side boxes and touching the response tool inside, thereby breaking an infrared
beam. (b) Subjects’ view of front panel: once the chosen delay ended, food rewards dispensed into the centre food bin.

observe when the subject finished eating all the food in a
given trial. A computer running MED-PC control and data
acquisition software controlled all outputs (stimulus lights,
pellet dispenser, tone generator and solenoids) and recorded
inputs (infrared beams, user-input button) via a program
written in Medstate Notation.
Trial and Session Procedures
Every trial consisted of an initial intertrial interval (ITI)
of 30 s, a 15-s period during which subjects could make a
choice, the delay following the subject’s choice, and a handling period during which subjects consumed the food reward. At the beginning of a choice period, a short (0.5 s)
tone sounded, both doors opened, and lights above the tools
illuminated to denote each available option. We counterbalanced across subjects whether purple or yellow lights were
associated with receiving two pellets immediately or six pellets after a time delay. For all trials, we randomly assigned
the side of the enclosure for larger and smaller rewards.
Subjects then had 15 s to make a response. Once subjects responded, the light associated with the chosen option flashed,

a tone sounded, the alternate option’s light extinguished,
and its door closed. The chosen delay then began, and during the delay, the experimenter closed the chosen door (via
a user-input button) after the subject removed his/her hand.
Once the delay finished, the tone stopped and the white
light in the centre food bin illuminated. This light flashed
every time a piece of food dispensed; once all the food was
dispensed, the light remained illuminated during the handling period. The light associated with the subject’s choice
also remained illuminated during the handling time. When
the subject finished eating (marked when the subject placed
the last piece of food in his/her mouth), the experimenter
pressed the user response button to extinguish all lights and
begin the next ITI.
Each daily session consisted of 14 completed trials. For
each condition/delay combination, subjects first completed a
forced-choice session in which they received only one option
per trial (either two pellets immediately or six pellets after
a delay); this session allowed them to gain familiarity with
the reward contingencies. To pass the forced-choice session,
subjects could fail to make a choice within 15 s no more than
twice in a session. If a subject failed to choose more than
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two times, then we aborted the session and started afresh
the next day. After passing the forced-choice session, subjects completed three free-choice sessions at that same condition and delay, in which we allowed them to freely choose
between the two options. In a free-choice session, the first
four trials were forced-choice, and the last 10 were freechoice. Subjects had to successfully complete all forced trials but could fail to make a choice in no more than two nonconsecutive free trials.
Statistical Analysis
We analysed the data using repeated measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA). For the choice data, we performed
two ANOVAs. In the first, we used condition and delay period as within-subjects factors (a 2 × 3 design) and species as a between-subjects factor. In the second, we reanalysed these data to examine whether subjects’ choices
changed over the course of a session by using trial number
as a within-subjects factor (10 trials) and species as a between-subjects factor. Choice data consisted of the proportion of total picks for the large reward in a free-choice session. We arcsine, square-root transformed the proportions
to normalize the data. Two separate ANOVAs were conducted on the timing data: one for choice latencies (time
between stimulus onset and choice) and one for per-pellet handling time (time between first pellet dispensed and
last pellet consumed divided by number of pellets). Both
of these ANOVAs had condition and delay period as withinsubjects factors and species as a between-subjects factor.
We used the Huynh–Feldt correction when assumptions of
sphericity or homogeneity of variance were violated (Myers & Well 1995). We used Bonferroni test statistics on all
comparisons of means in the within-subject design, and
we report the pairwise comparisons with P ≤ 0.05 (Maxwell & Delaney 2004).
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15-s delay. These differences were not statistically significant (ANOVA: F2, 12 = 1.51, P = 0.26). Subjects chose
the large reward 71 ± 4% of the time in the normal condition and 67 ± 4% of the time in the incremental condition, but this difference also was not significant (ANOVA:
F1, 6 = 1.19, P = 0.32). There was, however, a significant
interaction between delay and condition (ANOVA: F2,
12 = 11.57, P < 0.01). At the 15-s delay, subjects chose
the large reward less on the incremental condition relative to the normal condition: subjects chose the large reward 71 ± 5% of the time in the normal condition, but
only 56 ± 6% of the time when in the incremental condition (Bonferroni post hoc comparison: P = 0.02; Fig. 3).
Moreover, subjects chose the large reward less in the incremental condition at the 15-s delay than in the incremental condition at a 10-s delay, as well as in the 5-s delay for both conditions (Bonferroni post hoc comparisons:
P < 0.05). This indicates that subjects in both species devalued rewards with increased handling times when the
delay to the large reward was long (Fig. 4).
The two species also differed with respect to the proportion of trials in which individuals chose the larger reward (ANOVA: F1, 6 = 8.97, P = 0.02). Across all delays
and conditions, marmosets selected the large reward an
average of 80 ± 5% of the time, whereas tamarins selected the large reward an average of 59 ± 5% of the
time (Fig. 5). A second ANOVA on the choice data for each

Results
IPI Determination
Based on observational measurements of individual-specific handling times for six pellets (range 9.99–23.7 s),
each subject was assigned an experimental IPI that doubled their handling time (range 3.3–7.9 s; Table 1).
Handling Time and Choice Data
Subjects required a mean ± SE of 2.3 ± 0.2 s to consume one piece of food in the normal condition and a
mean ± SE of 4.3 ± 0.5 s to consume one piece in the incremental condition. As factors, neither delay (ANOVA:
F2, 10 = 2.32, P = 0.15) nor species (ANOVA: F1, 6 = 0.85,
P = 0.39) influenced handling times: marmosets and tamarins took equivalent amounts of time to consume food
rewards across all three delays.
Subjects (pooled across species) chose the large reward 74 ± 5% of the time at a 5-s delay-to-large, 70 ± 4%
of the time at a 10-s delay, and 63 ± 5% of the time at a

Figure 3. Mean ± SE proportion of trials during which subjects (collapsed across species) chose the larger reward when the entire food
reward was dispensed at once (normal condition) and when an additional interpellet interval was added before each additional food
pellet was dispensed (incremental condition) following a delay-toreward of 5, 10 or 15 s. *P < 0.05.
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Figure 4. Mean ± SE proportion of trials during which marmosets
and tamarins chose the larger reward in each condition (normal,
incremental) following a 15-s delay-to-reward. *P < 0.05.

Figure 5. Mean ± SE proportion of trials during which individuals
of both species chose the larger reward (collapsed across all delays
and conditions). *P < 0.05.

subject’s performance across a session indicated that there
was no effect of trial (ANOVA: F9, 54 = 0.60, P = 0.79) on
discounting preferences. Subjects of both species chose
consistently throughout an experimental session, suggesting that the species difference in discounting level did not
result from different levels of satiation.

pay more attention to those temporal intervals that they
can directly affect with their behaviour but ignore those
that are obligatory and out of their control, even if they
influence the optimal long-term intake rate. Gallistel &
Gibbon (2000, page 322) make the analogy between ignoring certain time intervals and the “sunk cost” effect
described by economists, which is ‘a cost that appears to
be relevant to the computation of the utility of an alternative but in fact is not and ought to be ignored in rational (normative) economic decision making’.
Handling time did not significantly affect discounting
choices across all delays, however, suggesting that the increases in handling time are more relevant to tamarins
and marmosets when the delay to accessing food rewards
is already long. This contradicts the predictions of rate
maximization, because handling time should affect discounting levels more when it comprises a greater proportion of the total time interval. Since handling times are
a larger proportion of total time at short delays-to-food
access, according to rate maximization, handling time
should influence decisions more at the 5-s delay-to-large
than the 15-s delay-to-large. One possible explanation
for our finding is that, despite increased handling times,
subjects were still below their indifference points at the
shorter delays. That is, even including the additional handling time does not push the subject to the point at which
it should switch preferences. Alternatively, delays to food
and handling times may not be weighted linearly in discounting decisions; for example, handling times may be
more heavily weighted depending on the length of the
initial delay to accessing the food. Therefore, if we had
included longer delays-to-large, we might have seen a
larger effect of handling time at those delays. One way
to address these possibilities is to perform a discounting
titration that simultaneously manipulates both delay-toaccess and handling time. Such an experiment could assess the differential contributions of delays and handling
time to the monkeys’ discounting preferences.

Discussion
Handling Time and Rate Maximization
When faced with a decision between receiving two pieces
of food immediately and six pieces of food after 15 s, handling time affected discounting preferences in tamarins
and marmosets. This implies that both species showed
sensitivity to differences in handling time and adjusted
their preferences to account for these differences. As
predicted by a rate maximization model in which animals maximize over the entire delay and handling time
interval (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1996), a longer handling
time caused marmosets and tamarins to be less likely to
choose the larger reward.
Although many aspects of long-term rate do not affect
animal choices, tamarins and marmosets adjust their behaviour to account for the handling times associated with
food rewards. Why do animals include handling time
within their time horizon but ignore other temporal intervals in a discounting task (such as ITI and postfeeding
delays)? One possibility is that animals have evolved to
attend only to those intervals that occur between a decision and its outcome (see Bateson & Kacelnik, 1996). Animals have control over the time they spend processing
food because different options are associated with different handling times. In contrast, intervals that do not
occur between a decision and its outcome are not under
the direct control of a forager: animals have no choice
but to wait their entire duration. Animals may therefore
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The Temporal Properties of Food and
Ecological Factors
The results of this experiment also replicate the earlier
findings by Stevens et al. (2005a) that tamarins devalue
rewards more heavily than marmosets in temporal discounting tasks. Although that experiment used a titration
adjustment procedure to determine subjects’ indifference
points between the large and small rewards, and this experiment examined subject’s preferences across three different delays to the large reward, tamarins discounted
more steeply than marmosets in both paradigms. Additionally, in the previous study, subjects had full visual access
to both potential food rewards, whereas in this study, neither reward was visible until after the chosen time delay.
As previously mentioned, differences in ecology and
diet composition may explain the observed difference in
discounting level between these two species. The variation in the temporal distribution of their primary food
sources further suggests that tamarins and marmosets
may be differentially sensitive to changes in handling
time: marmosets may tolerate relatively long handling
times, whereas tamarins might be more sensitive to variation in search time. This experiment, however, indicates
that both species respond similarly to increases in handling times, suggesting a more general role of handling
time in foraging strategies. Nevertheless, tamarins’ and
marmosets’ respective dietary specializations raise the
possibility that more natural ways of altering handling
times may trigger different responses. The handling time
manipulation presented here was very general and involved altering the handling time of a food item that the
monkeys do not naturally consume. Additionally, because
banana pellets are neither natural nor available in their
daily diets, subjects had to learn and remember the handling times required in different conditions. Moreover,
they had reduced control over the times they spent processing the food. This raises the possibility that when
feeding on actual gum, fruit or insects, such known physical entities might cue different discounting levels.
Although the experiment presented here did not explicitly address the mechanistic basis of discounting decisions, one possible explanation for the differences in
tamarin and marmoset discounting levels is that the
two species differ in either their ability to time intervals
or in the strength of their timing preferences (for a reviews of cross-species timing experiments, see Gibbon
et al., 1984 and Richelle and Lejeune, 1984). Few studies have explicitly studied timing abilities in primates,
and none have compared across two or more species using the same method. One possibility, then, is that tamarins and marmosets differ in their abilities to discriminate temporal intervals. Their similar responses to the
incremental condition suggest a lack of large perceptual
differences, especially since both species reduced their
discounting levels in response to small additional IPIs.
However, the two species may differ in their temporal
preferences for delays to food: marmosets may actually
lack strong time preferences relative to the tamarins. For
a marmoset, waiting the shorter delay and waiting the
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longer delay may be (subjectively) about the same. If they
do indeed lack strong time preferences, then the length
of delay would influence marmosets less than tamarins
when making a discounting decision.
What Is Handling Time and When Is It Relevant?
A possible criticism of our manipulation is its artificiality. We construe the incremental condition as a manipulation of handling time, but the subjects may not have
perceived it in this way. Rather than treating the incrementally dispensed food as one reward distributed over
a longer interval, they may have interpreted it as many
separate, discrete rewards (although Brunner & Gibbon
(1995) suggest this is not the case for pigeons). Our experimental design attempted to minimize this possibility
by making the additional IPI a function of each individual’s handling time. However, in the incremental condition, subjects also did not have visual access to the entire reward throughout the entire handling time period.
Since visual attention influences impulsivity in human
children (Mischel & Ebbesen 1970), it may influence delay mechanisms in other animals as well.
The potential artificiality of this experiment leads to
the further question of how we conceptualize handling
time. Handling time is generally treated as a uniform
process, but clearly many different activities can compose total handling time (Lea, 1979; Snyderman, 1983).
In this experiment alone, handling time included retrieving the food, eating it, and additional periods of rest during which food was available but the animal had not finished consuming it. Do animals perceive all of these
components in the same way, or do they weight them
differently in discounting contexts? Do animals perceive
our task of waiting between pellets as an increase in handling time? One way to examine whether the composition
of handling time matters is to look at discounting across
food types that require different sorts of processing. The
subjects could easily consume the food rewards utilized
in this experiment, but other types of food require more
elaborate processing, such as removing seeds from fruit
and extracting edible parts of prey items. Manipulating
handling time via a more realistic foraging task involving the presentation of fruit or insects will enrich our understanding of how handling time affects discounting in
a broader range of foraging contexts.
Similarly, rate maximization models assume that delays-to-food access and time spent handling food are interchangeable: both contribute to the total rate of intake,
so increases in one are equivalent to increases in the
other. There is evidence, however, that animals may not
treat these periods as equivalent. Shettleworth & Jordan
(1986) found that rats prefer handling sunflower seeds
(that is, spend time removing their husk) over waiting
to receive unhusked seeds. The authors point out a potential mechanistic explanation for this result: a husked
seed may act as a stronger reinforcer than a delay signal.
Since waiting is a passive behaviour, whereas processing is more active, having our subjects simply wait while
individual food rewards became available may not be an
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ideal manipulation of handling time. The level of attention focused on the food item could affect time perception (Brown 1985), thereby influencing rate calculation.
To test fully whether waiting and processing are equivalent, one must combine the Shettleworth & Jordan design
with our own, having subjects either wait for each reward item or process an equivalent amount for an equivalent time period in a discounting paradigm.
Finally, in natural foraging settings, the delay and handling times may involve different activities and be associated with different risks. For example, a food reward
that is being processed is more certain than one that has
not yet been obtained. But long handling times may also
be risky for a different reason: competitors can steal the
food item, which is a risk that obviously does not exist
before food has been obtained. As such, long handling
times may be more relevant to some foragers than long
search times.
Conclusions
Both tamarins and marmosets adjusted their choices to
account for handling time at long delays to accessing food
rewards. They responded similarly to increases in handling time, despite overall differences in discounting levels: tamarins devalued future rewards more steeply than
marmosets, replicating earlier results on temporal discounting in these species (Stevens et al. 2005a). Combined with work by Bateson & Kacelnik (1996), our work
implies that models of discounting behaviour that include
handling times may better account for the choices that animals make than models that only include delays to food.
Further experiments are necessary to determine how animals weight handling time relative to delays to food, as
well as whether different types of food-processing activities have equal influence on discounting decisions.
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